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DCI/IC 83-0719/1

11 AUG 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Eloise R. Page  
Acting Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Memorandum to Edward J. O'Malley, FBI re  
Terms of Reference for the Establishment and  
Functions of the DCI Committee on Hostile  
Intelligence Threat Analysis [redacted]

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1. Action: Your review of the attached memorandum and  
concurrence with the recommendation below. [redacted]

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2. Recommendation: That the memorandum be signed and  
forwarded to Mr. O'Malley. [redacted]

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Signed

Eloise R. Page

Attachment:  
a/s

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

Attachment 1

Establishment and Functions of the DCI Committee on Hostile  
Intelligence Threat Analysis

Terms of Reference

**I. INTRODUCTION**

It is the DCI's intention to establish a DCI Committee on hostile intelligence threat analysis.

**II. SCOPE OF COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES**

- A. The Committee on Hostile Intelligence Threat Analysis will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his responsibilities to assess, analyze, and report to the National Security Council and to the Congress on the totality of hostile intelligence threats against the United States.
- B. The integrated totality of the threat, to include HUMINT, SIGINT, and other technical threats, deception, and any combination of the above, will be within the purview of the Committee.

**III. METHODOLOGY**

- A. Under the guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Committee will:
  - 1. Review all multidisciplinary counterintelligence analytical production to ensure that the total hostile intelligence threat is continually recognized and recorded.

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2. Identify shortfalls and weaknesses in the Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and useful multidisciplinary counterintelligence analysis.
3. Recommend to the DCI areas in which significant improvement in multidisciplinary counterintelligence analysis can be achieved.

**IV. COORDINATION**

At the request of the Committee Chairman, Intelligence Community elements will provide information relevant to the Committee's mission and functions.

**V. COMPOSITION**

- A. The Committee will be chaired by the Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- B. The members of the Committee will be designated by the National Foreign Intelligence Council principals.
- C. The Committee will have no permanent staff. Staff support will be provided by the Community Counterintelligence Staff.

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Attachment 2

MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR THE DCI COMMITTEE  
ON  
HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT ANALYSIS

Chairman - Mr. Edward J. O'Malley, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Members - Mr. Robert Gates, Central Intelligence Agency  
[redacted] National Security Agency  
Mr. Dennis Kux, Department of State/INR  
[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency

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Attachment 3

TERMS OF REFERENCE AND OUTLINE  
DCI STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE  
COMMUNITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
ANALYTICAL EFFORTS

Introduction:

This study is predicated on instructions from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) which directed the Director of Central Intelligence "to prepare an in-depth report on how best to meet the needs of the United States Government for multidisciplinary counterintelligence analysis."

Purpose:

To examine the adequacy of the Intelligence Community's counterintelligence (CI) analytical effort, to include assessments of the adequacy of organizations tasked with such production, and of coordinating mechanisms for CI analysis.

Issues:

1. How can multidisciplinary CI analysis help to detect Soviet intelligence efforts to compromise or defeat the most vital US intelligence systems, technological advantages, or other national security assets?
2. How can possible Soviet deceptions be discovered by performing analysis that looks at all foreign intelligence?
3. How can the security of vital systems be tested and protected?
4. Is the Community's CI analysis so organizationally fragmented and so operationally oriented that there is no one responsible for developing a comprehensive, in-depth understanding of foreign intelligence threats to the United States?

Definitions:

Multidisciplinary refers to analysis making full, integrated use of information from all intelligence sources (i.e., HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, etc.).

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CI refers to activities designed to learn about or thwart foreign intelligence operations directed against the United States or its interests.

Methodology:

Intelligence Community agencies are requested to provide input to the study in the form of answers to the following questions.

- A. Describe your agency's CI analytical efforts, including:
  - 1. Source of tasking.
  - 2. Types of products; subject areas, including sample titles/descriptions.
  - 3. Dissemination of products.
  - 4. Number and expertise of CI analysts.
  - 5. CI analytical production plans for FY84, FY85.
- B. Concerning CI analytical products published by other agencies:
  - 1. What publications do you receive?
  - 2. Comment on their strengths, weaknesses, and usefulness to your organization.
- C. Comment on the potential role of multidisciplinary, in-depth CI analysis in response to the aforementioned issues. Recommend actions to improve the Community's CI analytical effort.
- D. Should there be a single organization in the U.S. Government dedicated to multidisciplinary CI analysis? Should this be a new or an existing organization? If position is negative, provide rationale. If position is positive, include in rationale recommendations as to optimum organizational affiliation of such an office, staffing, etc.

Request responses to CCIS by 15 September 1983.

CCIS will consolidate responses and submit a draft report to the Community for coordination. The completed report will be submitted to the DCI for his approval by 1 November 1983.

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